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1 
Introduction  
 
Students of ‘race’, class, ethnicity and violent crime in Europe and North America 
have been preoccupied by the reportedly higher rates of violence committed by ethnic 
minorities. Although it has been observed that, on both sides of the Atlantic, most crime is 
committed – unsurprisingly – by the white majority community, popular concern and 
scholarly attention have focused on the disproportionate rates of arrest and imprisonment 
among minority communities. As Russell (1998) suggests, a preoccupation with such 
concepts as ‘black criminality’ and ‘black-on-black-crime’ have tended to obscure or 
ignore the extent of ‘white-on-white crime’ or ‘white-on-minority’ violence, to the extent 
that the very terms seem odd. A further consequence of the narrow focus of the ‘race and 
crime debate’ is that, until recently at least, criminologists and others have tended to 
ignore racist violence; that is violence specifically targeted against ethnic minority 
communities and incidents that are aggravated by racism and racial prejudice. 
In recent years, this situation has started to change significantly. In the 1980s, public 
concern about racist violence increased in north America (Hamm 1993a & b, Pinkney 
1994), continental Europe (Bjorgø and Witte 1993) and Britain (Bowling 1999) which led 
to the development of new directions in research and public policy. During the 1990s, a 
number of well-publicised incidents heightened this concern about racist violence in 
numerous places. In the early 1990s in Germany, for example, there was a spate of arson 
attacks against asylum seekers’ hostels and the homes of people from ethnic minorities. Of 
these crimes, the most atrocious was an arson attack on November 23, 1992 in Molln by 
two neo-Nazi skinheads in which three members of the Arslan family, of Turkish origin, 
were burned to death (Hamm 1993a). 
Of the recent cases in the USA, the murder of James Byrd stands out as the epitome of 
a racist crime. On June 7 1998, John William King, Shawn Berry and Lawrence Brewer, 
three roommates, were out driving when they encountered James Byrd hitchhiking. After 
offering him a lift, the three then beat Byrd unconscious, stripped him and chained him to 
the back of their pickup truck and dragged him for two and a half miles until his head and 
right arm were ripped from his body. At the subsequent trial, it was found that King had 
been involved, for some years, in racist extremism and was tattooed with nazi SS symbols 
and a depiction of a black man being lynched. All three men were found guilty of murder. 
King and Brewer were sentenced to death by lethal injection while Berry – who had no 
history of racist activities – was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole 
for 40 years. 
On April 22, 1993, while waiting with a friend for a bus in Eltham, South-East 
London, England, Stephen Lawrence, an 18 year-old black man, was stabbed to death. 
Stephen’s friend, Duwayne Brooks later reported that Stephen, looking out for the bus 
further up the street, had been engulfed by a group of five or six white youths, one of 
whom shouted “what, what, nigger!”. Stephen Lawrence was stabbed twice with a long 
knife, both stab wounds severing major arteries. After running some distance he bled to 
death on the pavement. In February 1997, an Inquest jury returned a unanimous verdict 
that “Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully killed in a completely unprovoked racist attack by 
five white youths” (Macpherson 1999). 
The police investigation following Stephen’s death failed to lead to the conviction of 
the killers and was condemned as ‘palpably flawed’ and incompetent. In July 1997, after 
more than four years of campaigning by Neville and Doreen Lawrence, Stephen’s parents, 
the Home Secretary Jack Straw announced a public inquiry into the murder.. The 
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Lawrence Inquiry, chaired by Sir William Macpherson1, took evidence from 88 witnesses 
and received 148 written submissions amounting to more than 100,000 pages of evidence 
(Macpherson, 1999). The report concluded that there was a series of fundamental flaws in 
the conduct of the investigation by the Metropolitan Police Service and that this was the 
result of “professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by 
senior officers” (Macpherson 1999: 317). It documented the denial of the racist motive for 
the murder among at least five police officers, and the racist stereotyping of Duwayne 
Brooks at the scene where he was wrongly assumed to be one of the protagonists in a fight 
between youths rather than a victim of an unprovoked attack. It went on to criticise the use 
of inappropriate and offensive language and the insensitive and patronising handling of 
Mr and Mrs Lawrence throughout the investigation. 
The murder of Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent flawed police investigation 
echoes the experience of many victims of racist violence in Britain. Rather than being an 
isolated case, it epitomises the extensive empirical and documentary evidence gathered 
over the last four decades.2 The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on the 
British experience of racist violence and points tentatively towards some explanations for 
the patterns that emerge. Also examined are some of the individual, community and 
statutory responses to victimisation, raising questions about the effectiveness of policing 
and law enforcement. While the focus is on the British experience of violent racism, the 
parallels in other European and North American countries points to the international 
nature of white-on-minority violence. 
 
 
The extent and nature of racist victimisation 
 
The history of racist violence in Britain is a long, but discontinuous one (see Panayi 
1996, Bowling 1999). There is evidence of attempts at forced removal of people of colour 
since the time of Elizabeth I and example of attacks against Jews in Britain stretching 
back to the twelfth century (Fryer 1984; Panayi 1996). The violence targeting of black and 
Asian sailors in British ports immediately after World War I and World War II (in 1948) 
is well documented (Jenkinson 1996; Panayi 1996). The late 1950s saw several anti-black 
riots in London, Nottingham and elsewhere (Panayi 1996). During the 1970s, the 
emergence of the ‘skinhead’ youth culture, its link with the rise in popularity of extreme 
right political activism was accompanied by an apparent increase in racist incidents. These 
developments led to an increase in official concern, and, eventually in the 1980s the police 
and Home Office began to keep records of ‘racial incidents’ (Bowling 1999). These have 
shown steady increases since the 1980s, to stand at just under 14,000 incidents recorded in 
1998 (see Figure 1). 
Recent Home Office Research has shed some light on patterns of racially motivated 
incidents recorded by the police (Maynard and Read 1997). Based on a survey of all 
police forces in England and Wales, the authors found that there was wide variation in 
what was actually recorded and counted as racially motivated counted as racially 
motivated (see also Sibbitt 1997; Bowling 1999). Where the type of crime was known, 
                                              
1 See Macpherson (1999), Cathcart (1999); Norton Taylor (1999); Bowling (1999), Thompson (1988). 
2 See, for example, Thompson (1988) Gordon (1990), Hesse et al (1992), Virdee (1995) Human Rights 
Watch (1997), Bowling (1999). 
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38% of incidents comprised verbal abuse, 21% were assaults and 20% involved damage to 
property. Only two per cent were recorded as serious crime. However, where racially 
motivated incidents were recorded as serious crime  - such as ‘Grievous Bodily Harm’ or 
murder - they were frequently not recorded as racial incidents. Thus, their categorisation 
as a specific type of serious crime overrode and negated their definition by the police as 
‘racial’ (see also Bowling 1999: 151-4). To some extent this was what happened in the 
Stephen Lawrence murder. 
The police forces that record the largest number of racially motivated incidents tend to 
be in metropolitan areas where there are significant ethnic minority communities. After 
calculating the number of racially motivated incidents per 1,000 ethnic minority 
population, however, Maynard and Read (1997) found that three provincial forces in the 
north of England had the highest victimisation rates of 14 or more per 1000 black or Asian 
population. Differences in reporting and recording practices dog attempts to make 
comparisons of the extent and nature of racist violence across time and space. 
Nonetheless, this finding supports earlier research that when people from ethnic minorities 
make up only a small proportion of the local population, they are at greater risk of 
victimisation than their ‘inner-city’ counterparts (see Smith 1989; Hesse et al 1993; 
Sampson and Phillips 1992, 1996; Bowling 1999). 
Survey estimates of racist violence 
Like any other form of crime, racial ‘incidents’ recorded by the police reflect only a 
small proportion of all those that occur – thus concealing the so-called ‘dark figure’ of 
unreported and unrecorded crime. In order to overcome the inadequacies of police records 
since the early 1980s, a number of local crime surveys have attempted to make 
quantitative estimates of racist violence. Each of these has identified low levels of 
reporting to the police (see for example Brown 1984; Jones et al. 1986). In Bowling’s 
study in the London Borough of Newham, 21 per cent of Black women, 19 per cent of 
Asian men, 18 per cent of Asian women and 17 per cent of Black men had experienced 
some form of racist victimisation (1993b, 1999: 196). A small proportion of white people 
– eight per cent of men and seven per cent of women – also said that they had been 
racially victimised. In this locality, Bowling estimated that no more than five per cent of 
racial incidents were recorded by the police (see also Saulsbury and Bowling 1991, 
Bowling 1993b). 
Every sweep of the British Crime Survey (1988 to 1996) has found that more than one 
third of assaults directed against Asians and Blacks were thought by respondents to be 
racially motivated, as were about half of the incidents involving threats. The use of racist 
language was the main reason given by both black and Asian respondents for thinking that 
the incident was racially motivated. Using British Crime Survey (BCS) data for 1988 and 
1992 combined, FitzGerald and Hale (1996) found that of a national sample, four per cent 
of blacks, five per cent of Indians and around eight per cent of Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis had been the victims of racially motivated offences in the previous year. 
Population estimates using BCS victimisation rates suggested that there were about 
143,000 incidents of crime and threats against black and Asian people in England and 
Wales which were thought to have been motivated by racism in 1997 (Percy 1998). This 
represented 15% of the estimated total of 984,000 incidents against them altogether. 
Around 41,000 of these incidents were reported to the police, compared with the 12,222 
recorded by the police that year. Expressed as a proportion, 29% of the incidents are 
reported to the police, and about 8 per cent are recorded by the police.  
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The process of racist victimisation and its impact 
Estimating the ‘real’ extent of violent racism is an exercise fraught with conceptual 
and methodological problems (Bowling 1993a, 1999: 150-168; Hesse et al 1992). Not 
only is the attempt to count so many complex events occurring across time and place 
difficult, it is in some ways misconceived. Considering the patterns of intimidation and 
harassment that provide part of the context for serious violence, it becomes clear that the 
issues of safety and perceptions of safety cannot realistically be ‘measured’. Feminist 
research on violence against women has also observed that the experience of sexual 
assault or domestic violence can be better understood as a continuum, connecting 
‘everyday’ abuse with extreme acts of violence (e.g. Kelly 1987; Stanko 1988). Similarly, 
conceiving of violent racism as a process allows connections to be made between the 
racist abuse at one end of the spectrum and murder at the other. Studies have confirmed 
the pattern of repeat victimisation among victims of racist violence (e.g. Sampson and 
Phillips, 1992; Phillips and Sampson 1998).  
This context also helps to explain ethnic minorities’ elevated fear of crime (Genn 
1988, Pearson et al 1989, Feagin and Sikes 1994, Bowling 1999). On a number of 
dimensions, people from ethnic minority communities are more fearful than those from 
white communities, and this is particularly the case in relation to fear of violent racism. 
The BCS probes further to attempt to measure people’s perceptions of safety and unsafety. 
Percy (1998) showed that on the street, and especially at home alone at night, people from 
ethnic minorities felt less safe than white people and it seems likely that feelings of 
‘unsafety’ affect individual freedom of movement. For example, people from ethnic 
minorities (Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in particular) avoided going out at night through 
fear of crime, avoided walking near certain types of people and were always accompanied 
when walking out after dark. More detailed analysis showed that while 13% of white 
respondents said they avoided certain places or events (such as football matches, night-
clubs, theatres or pubs) because they feared crime or violence, this was true of 29% of 
blacks, 27% of Indians and 22% of Pakistani and Bangladeshis (Percy 1998: 33). 
Although the relationship between fear crime and victimisation is a complex one, fear of 
‘ordinary crime’ among people from ethnic minority communities is fundamentally 
shaped by their fear of racist victimisation. Although this is not a frequent occurrence for 
most people, pernicious racist abuse does sometimes precede extreme acts of violence, as 
exemplified in the case of Stephen Lawrence. This experience provides a backdrop to the 
lives of many people from ethnic minorities in Britain today. 
Police records and victimisation surveys, as previously mentioned, are the two most 
common methods of quantifying the extent of violent racism. Although this measurement 
has its value, alternative sources often provide richer and more meaningful information. 
Among these alternative sources are qualitative techniques (e.g. Chahal 1999); case 
studies employing mixed methods (e.g. Bowling 1999); journalistic accounts (e.g. Rose 
1996; Bufford 1991); records of local monitoring groups (e.g. Newham Monitoring 
Project 1991); and public inquiries, such as that carried out by Macpherson into the events 
surrounding the murder of Stephen Lawrence (see also Hesse et al 1992). Indeed, like 
sexual harassment and domestic violence against women, the issue of racist violence 
emerged onto the public and public agenda only as a result of the work of activists 
campaigning for victims’ rights who drew, for their evidence, on case studies and 
documentary methods. 
There are, of course, some methodological limitations to using these sources. 
Journalistic accounts may be unrepresentative while reports of monitoring groups are 
typically partisan in nature. Nonetheless, both are often richer and more contextualised 
than academic sources that rely on interviews with someone once or, at most, on only a 
few occasions. Similarly, public inquiries provide the opportunity to learn about the way 
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in which individuals and organisations think about problems. By documenting the 
collective experience of thousands of people who have experienced such violence, a 
greater degree of insight can be gained regarding the victims’ perspective. 
We can now say with some confidence that racist violence affects a considerable 
proportion of the ethnic minority communities in Britain on an enduring basis, and that 
serious and mundane incidents are interwoven to create a threatening environment which 
undermines their personal safety and freedom of movement. What is now required is a 
shift away from the victimological perspective to an analysis of the characteristics of 
offenders, the social milieu in which violence is fostered, and the process by which it 
becomes directed against ethnic minorities (Bowling 1999: 305). 
Racist offending: from profiling to explanation 
The focus on victims has tended to obscure the importance of researching racist 
offenders. Moreover, there has been a reluctance to examine racist offenders, partly 
perhaps, because it risks appearing to ‘understand’ racist behaviour rather than simply to 
‘condemn’ it (Bowling 1999: 306). Racist offenders have no allies in the political 
mainstream; they are doubly condemned because of their violence and their racist 
expressions. Police and politicians rarely get beyond epithets – ‘yobs’, ‘louts’ and ‘thugs’ 
– to describe such offenders. Even criminologists have frequently opted for shallow 
‘theoreotyping’, constructing academic theories out of common stereotypes (Pitts 1993; 
Bowling 1999: 305). There has been a renaissance in research on offending and offenders 
in recent years, but there are still few studies that seek to explore racist offenders’ 
backgrounds, experiences and motives.3 And yet, examining the offender’s perspective is 
critical for developing ways of responding to violent racism. 
 Until recently, our knowledge of racist offenders relied principally on information 
from the victim. We know from victims’ accounts that most of the people committing acts 
of violent racism are are young adult males – aged between 16 and 25 – though young 
children and older adults have been reported (Mayhew et al 1989; Aye Maung and 
Mirrlees Black, 1994; Sibbitt 1997; Bowling 1999). Using 1992 BCS data, Aye Maung 
and Mirrlees-Black (1994) found that three-quarters of Asian victims of violent incidents 
(wounding, common assault and robbery) and threats involved more than one offender and 
two fifths involved four or more. Nine out of ten Asian council tenants interviewed in 
Bowling (1999) who had been victimised, were attacked by more than one offender. In 
instances of violence or threats reported to the British Crime Survey which were thought 
to be racially motivated, victims nearly always cited white offenders.  
Sibbitt’s (1997) qualitative study of the perpetrators of racist harassment adds the 
socio-economic dimension to this profile, using police records, case studies and 
interviews. Sibbitt found that the perpetrators’ racist views were shared by the 
communities to which they belonged, and offenders saw this as legitimating their action. 
Thus, wider communities not only ‘spawn’ perpetrators but they reinforce their behaviour 
by not condemning it. Although Sibbitt’s typology of racist offenders identifies three 
types (‘the pensioners’, the ‘people next door’ and the ‘problem family’), they are all 
united by their attitudes towards ethnic minorities which serve to focus individuals’ 
grievances and sense of injustice on an external scapegoat. Frequently, racist offenders 
react to what they see as preferential treatment or access to scarce social and economic 
resources, such as housing, employment and education. This is illustrated by a comment 
                                              
3 See, for example, Bufford (1993) and Webster (1997). 
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made a woman in Sibbitt's study: “They refuse to learn English – the kids have to get a 
special teacher in. My son could do with a special teacher, but he won’t get it, will he?” 
(1997: 102) 
The evidence that violent racism is concentrated in areas of multiple deprivation 
points to the relevance of economic and social factors. However, per capita rates of 
victimisation suggest that racist violence also afflicts rural, suburban and relatively 
prosperous areas as well as blighted inner-city locales.4 Moreover, the evidence for a 
relationship between economic changes and violent crime in general is mixed. Field 
(1990) found that violent crime increases during periods of increased consumption and 
declines during periods of economic downturn. The economic scapegoating of ethnic 
minorities is one of five main theoretical approaches to explaining why ethnic minorities 
are the targets of violence directed against individuals, their homes, places of worship or 
entertainment, and at other aspects of social and cultural life. 
A second popular explanation contends that levels of hostility and violence are related 
to the size of minority populations, or an increase in numbers over a short period of time 
(Bjorgø and Witte, 1993). In 1958, for example, riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill were 
said by Labour and Conservative politicians to have been caused by the arrival of ‘too 
many’ black people, which had caused resentment among the 'indigenous' white 
population resulting in a violent backlash (Bowling 1999: 29-34). The ‘upsurge’ in racist 
violence in Germany in the early 1990s was blamed directly by many commentators on 
the arrival of a ‘flood’ of asylum seekers. In our view, this reasoning is flawed for several 
reasons. Historically, minority populations have come under attack in Britain even when 
their numbers were tiny - in the thousands or even mere hundreds, as was the case in the 
riots in 1919 (Jenkinson 1996). In Britain today, racist violence is also prevalent where 
black and Asian people make up only a small minority – sometimes only one or two per 
cent – of local populations. The ‘numbers thesis’ also fails to explain violence against 
Jewish people, their property, places of worship and burial, when they comprise only 
0.5% of the population of the United Kingdom (UK) (Institute of Jewish Affairs 1994). 
Although actual numbers, or even increases in numbers, may not provide an explanation 
for violent racism, it may be that the meaning attached to these changes does. Research 
has indicated that racist violence is common in neighbourhoods where black and Asian 
people make up a small but increasing minority of a neighbourhood and where 
community sentiment defines this as problematic. Authors including Husbands (1983), 
Smith (1989) and Hesse et al (1992) point to the relationship between racist victimisation 
and white territorialism and exclusionism. 'White neighbourhoods' may be maintained 
because “[t]he prospect of violent intimidation is a strong disincentive to black households 
who might otherwise wish to move away from the poor properties in which they are over-
represented” (S. Smith 1989: 161-2). 
The attempt to explain the extent of violent racism as a reaction to “the numbers” is 
consistent with the assumption that policies to reduce the number of immigrants would 
reduce the extent of violence targeted against them. In contrast to this view, however, the 
empirical evidence from several contexts suggests that racist violence has increased 
dramatically after governments have advocated or implemented measures to restrict 
immigration and asylum. Among the periods of most ferocious racist violence in the UK 
was 1981 in the immediate aftermath of the 1981 Nationality Act which ended ‘primary 
immigration’ from former colonies in the Caribbean and Africa, and also severely 
restricted the rights of dependants to join families settled in Britain. In Sweden, a wave of 
racist violence started in May 1990 five months after the government tightened its liberal 
                                              
4 see also Husbands (1993) 
7 
asylum policy (Bjorgø and Witte 1993: 7; Bjorgø 1993). In Germany, racist attacks and 
riots intensified dramatically after the government initiated a debate on reducing the 
numbers of asylum-seekers coming into the country (Bjorgø and Witte 1993: 7-8; 
Atkinson 1993). 
Theories of culture comprise a third approach to explaining racist violence. Common 
in media representations of racist violence are depictions of racism as an aspect of 
'national character'. Goldhagen (1996: 7) argues that the holocaust in Germany must be 
seen as a specifically German phenomenon, rooted in the pursuit of “German national 
political goals” (1996: 7). His approach is to “explain the culture’s constitution, its 
idiosyncratic patterns of practice, and its collective projects and products.” (1996: 15). 
England’s history of racism is very different from Germany’s. However, the history of 
chattel slavery, colonialism and support for South African apartheid, as well as the 
configuration of contemporary racism might suggest that racist violence has a specifically 
English cultural variant. 
A fourth approach draws on the evidence that racist violence is associated with the 
consumption of alcohol either as a direct result of intoxication (by lowering inhibitions) or 
in the social context of drinking, such as crowd behaviour after bars have closed. 
Although it seems likely that alcohol can be seen as a contributory factor, the “drunken 
pranks” explanation is frequently used to suggest that incidents are unconnected with 
racism. Some practitioners have gone to ridiculous lengths to redefine racist incidents as 
merely drunken hooliganism (see Graeff 1989: 131; Pearson et al, 1989: 128). Heavy 
consumption of alcohol is common in diverse forms of violent racism. Anti-Jewish 
pogroms in Russia at the turn of the century (Klier 1993: 133-35), riots against Italian 
immigrants in France in the 1890s, numerous instances of racist violence in Britain, and 
fire bombings of asylum centres in Scandinavia and Germany in the 1990s, all appear to 
have alcohol as a contributory factor (Bjorgø 1993: 35-6, 41-2). However, the finding that 
offenders are often found to be under the influence of alcohol can be misinterpreted to 
mean that no further explanation is necessary. Alcohol should be seen as only one means 
for overcoming inhibitions once a situation arises. As Bjorgø and Witte put it, “even if an 
act of violence is perpetrated under the influence of alcohol, this certainly does not mean 
that it may not also be influenced by racist motives” (1993: 10). 
Although the activities of extreme right-wing organisations5, and their links to 
ordinary communities are well documented in numerous contexts, this, fifth theoretical 
approach has rarely been used to analyse the experiences of ethnic minority victims in the 
UK. It is evident that many aspects of the ideology, language and practices of explicitly 
racist or extreme-right wing groupings are shared in common across Europe, and the 
United States (Bjorgø and Kaplan 1998). Lööw (1993), for example, interviewed members 
of the Swedish ‘white power networks’, and found that the rhetoric of these networks is a 
mixture of national socialist terminology of the 1930s and the contemporary code of the 
Ku Klux Klan and other American white supremacist groups. Themes identified by Lööw 
in Sweden – including a belief in ‘ZOG - Zionist Occupational Government’, denial of the 
holocaust, defence of the ‘white race’ against its ‘enemies’ (communists, homosexuals, 
Jews, immigrants and anti-racists) – appear to be common to similar organisations in other 
Scandinavian countries, Germany, the USA and Britain. The similarity between these 
materials is uncanny: and at their centre is a notion of a specifically European superiority 
and supremacy (see Bjorgø and Kaplan 1998). 
                                              
5 There are numerous such groups including National Front, Column 88, British National Party, Combat 18, 
the Ku Klux Klan, White Aryan Resistance, etc; Choice; English Solidarity; International Third Position 
(See Searchlight, the international anti-Fascist magazine and the Campaign Against Racism and Facism 
(CARF). 
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In several different national contexts there appears to be a relationship between the 
most extreme forms of racist politics and the manifestation of both explicitly racist attacks 
and apparently apolitical acts of violence directed at ethnic minorities. It seems that 
politically motivated racists are able to influence - directly and indirectly - groups of 
young people who hold “anti-immigration” views or who are in some other way 
sympathetic to racist ideology. Although international neo-Nazi groups appear to have 
little centralised leadership or hierarchy, they do co-operate in a number of ways (Jensen 
1993; Fekete 1991). The British National Party, for example, has participated with 
German neo-Nazi groups in paramilitary training. One crucial medium for spreading racist 
ideas and inciting violence is "Oi-music" with extremely brutal, racist and violent lyrics 
and its associated youth culture. A recent development is the use of computer networks by 
neo-Nazi organisations and racist supremacists. Internet newsgroups exist where racist 
ideology can be disseminated, Nazi memorabilia purchased and distributed, and 
information on bomb-making, ‘hit-lists’, and hate campaigning circulated. 
One final approach to explaining racist violence that deserves a mention is a theory 
proposed by Beck and Tolnay (1995) which integrates some of the elements set out above. 
Their thesis is based on an analysis of violence towards African Americans in the era of 
the white lynch mob and can be expressed as a formula. Beck and Tolnay argue that the 
potential for racist violence is the product of the extent of racist ideology, the 
permissiveness of the State response to racist violence and competition for scarce 
resources (such as economic wealth, political power and social status). If each of these 
necessary factors are present, all that remains is some form of ‘triggering event’ to lead to 
an outbreak of anti-black violence. 
Responses to racist violence 
Individual and community self-defence 
 
Although survey research has focused on fear of crime, the most commonly reported 
reaction to crime is anger. Bowling’s survey in East London for example, found that 70 
per cent of the victims of racist violence felt angry, compared with shock (44%), while 
comparatively few – 27% - felt fearful (1999: 216). The personal experiences of racist 
violence are so diverse, however, that it would be difficult to describe the ways in which 
individual people, families and communities have sought to shield themselves from 
victimisation. At the most personal, measures have included moving away from more 
spacious or well maintained property in localities where racist violence is prevalent to 
safer areas, and other strategies to avoid situations where ‘trouble’ may be found, such as 
particular pubs, or a particular area on football match-days. Individuals also put in place 
situational crime prevention measures such as shatterproof glass and fireproof letterboxes 
to reduce the impact of violent racist victimisation (Bowling 1999: 222). 
In response to a collective experience of victimisation, communities have also acted 
together in self-defence. In the 1958 racist riots, black transport workers provided escorts 
to and from places of employment. In response to racist assault in the 1970s and 1980s 
youth movements were formed to oppose racist organisations such as the National Front, 
who were staging provocative marches through areas of ethnic minority settlement. These 
grew in the 1980s into a strong self-defence movement, focusing on racist attacks and 
racism in policing, and were linked politically to the anti-racist movement (Newham 
Monitoring Project 1991).  
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The state response 
 
Witte (1996) has noted that the state response to racist violence has been very similar 
in France, the Netherlands and Britain. At first, governments ignored the problem entirely 
or denied the racist nature of the violence (Gordon 1990). When this was no longer 
possible because of the extent of demands among ethnic minority communities for 
protection, racism became linked with questions of ‘immigration’ and ‘integration’ of 
victimised communities while racial prejudice and violence were seen as ‘side effects’. 
Because migration was seen as the dominant topic, state responses largely consisted of 
migration-restricting policies (such as the Nationality and Immigration Acts (Solomos 
1993)) - what Witte refers to as ‘excluding recognition’ - and simultaneous anti-
discrimination policies (such as the Race Relations Acts 1965, 1968 and 1976). The 
resulting ‘two-faced’ state response is a result of being caught between “pressures from 
racist sentiments, parties and ideologies and pressures from anti-racism movements and 
ideologies” (Witte 1996: 201-3). 
The moment that the British state officially recognised racist violence as a specific 
social problem was November 1981, with the publication of the Home Office report, 
Racial Attacks (Home Office 1981). Until 1981, as racially motivated attacks and 
harassment did not officially exist, there was no publicly stated police or government 
policy to deal with them. Two years later, this situation had changed dramatically. A range 
of governmental agencies – among them the House of Commons, Home Office, 
Metropolitan Police, Association of Chief Police Officers and the Greater London Council 
– each elevated racist violence to the status of ‘urgent priority’ (see Bowling 1999, chapter 
3). Subsequent years have seen a rapidly increasing policy debate about ways of tackling 
racially motivated crime. This has focused on policing, the ‘multi-agency approach’ and 
new legislation. 
 
The police response 
 
Findings from the BCS suggest that satisfaction with the police response is 
significantly worse in dealing with reported racial incidents than with incidents in general. 
In Bowling's (1999) study of an area with a high rate of victimisation, just under one in 
ten people who reported to the police said they were very satisfied with the way in which 
the police handled the matter, while only 44% were very or fairly satisfied. This 
contrasted sharply with comparable 1988 BCS figures of 22% and 60%, respectively. This 
suggests that victims of racial incidents were much less likely to be satisfied with police 
service than victims of crime in general. The most common complaint among those who 
are dissatisfied with the police response, was that the police did not “do enough”, that they 
failed to keep the victim informed and that they seemed not to be interested (Bowling 
1999: 235-8). Some respondents were very critical of the police response, pointing 
specifically to what they saw as police prejudice against blacks and Asians. One 
commented, “They don't get the offenders.  And if they catch them they don't charge them.  
If I was to offend someone like this the police would harass me instead of turning a blind 
eye which is what I feel they do in case of white offenders.  And the offenders feel they 
can do anything they like as they are always let off.” (Bowling 1999: 237). The same 
study found that only a very small minority – as few as five per cent – felt generally very 
satisfied with the way in which racist harassment was dealt with in their area and less than 
one third expressed any satisfaction at all. This picture resonates with the documented 
experience of minority communities. A long string of reports on the police response to 
ethnic minorities in general and to the victims of violent racism have been highly critical 
of their treatment (see Bowling 1999 for a review). Early studies indicated that “the police 
do not do enough to detect the everyday crimes that affect ordinary people” and went 
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further to say that reporting crime sometimes invited police harassment such as rough 
treatment, inappropriate questioning and immigration checks (Institute of Race Relations 
1987). Such allegations continue to be made against the police today. 
It is clear that the police continue to deny that racist violence is a problem and are, 
in practice, frequently unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of racist motives for many 
attacks even in the face of strong evidence. This can, in part, be explained by racist 
stereotyping by individual officers who define ethnic minorities as potential offenders 
rather than as potential victims. This was the experience of Duwayne Brooks in the 
aftermath of the murder of his friend Stephen Lawrence. There is evidence of widespread 
racist assumptions, prejudice and stereotyping in the culture of the police organisation too. 
As Bowling (1999: 248-256) documents, many police officers were not only not opposed 
to racism, but actually shared the values of the racists who are victimising ethnic minority 
communities. Some police officers empathised with the white man who 'resented having 
his area taken over', sympathised with white 'yobs' who felt that 'the system' which should 
be working for them was working also for black and Asian communities. Some police 
officers interviewed by Bowling thought it 'despicable' when Asian people spoke their 
mother tongue, and believed that 'failing to adapt' to English customs (wearing traditional 
clothes, for example) rendered them both 'threatening' and 'vulnerable'. These racist 
attitudes and prejudices were clearly reflected in police officers' behaviour towards black 
and Asian victims, witnesses, suspects, employees and the general public. Compounding 
the effects of individual and cultural racism, is the institutional racism that is built into the 
policies and practices of the police organisation. This is the systemic discrimination 
against people from ethnic minorities irrespective of the intent of individuals. It is to be 
found in the stereotyping of people from ethnic minorities as shifty, untrustworthy and 
devious. And it can be seen in such outcomes as black and Asian victims being left 
dissatisfied with how the police handled their cases, about how well informed they were, 
and what action (or lack of it) is taken. The ultimate consequence of individual, cultural 
and institutional racism is a failure to deliver either a quality service or equality of service 
and protection. 
 
The multi-agency response
 
One of the central planks of government policy on racist victimisation throughout 
the 1980 and ’90s was the ‘multi-agency’, or ‘partnership approach’ (Home Office 1996). 
The origins of this approach lie in the history of post-war British rational scientific 
management and grew partly from the belief, which strengthened during the 1970s and 
1980s, that the police alone could not be expected to reduce crime (Weatheritt 1986; 
Bowling 1999: 101-149). Complex social problems like racism and violence are rooted in 
such contextual factors as, housing, education, and the consumption of alcohol. Such 
problems call for a multi-faceted approach involving the police, local government, 
community organisations, schools and other social institutions. Against the logic of this 
idea, however, the research on the effectiveness of the multi-agency approach, has been 
equivocal at best, and damning at worst (see for example, Rein 1983; Weatheritt 1986; 
Bowling 1999: 140-5). 
 
A multitude of problems beset attempts to develop a multi-agency approach to 
racist violence. Two Home Office-funded projects set up to develop the approach both fell 
short of their stated goals (Saulsbury and Bowling 1991, Bowling and Saulsbury 1993; 
Sampson and Phillips 1995, Phillips and Sampson 1998). Both studies identified major 
differences in the way in which organisations defined and understood the problem, a 
denial of the extent and nature of the problem, blaming victims for failing to ‘integrate’, 
and a reluctance to investigate or take action taken against perpetrators for fear of a white 
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backlash. Ethnic minorities who experienced violent racist victimisation were not defined 
as victims, were blamed for their own victimisation, or were informed that inaction 
against offenders was the most appropriate statutory response, all at the same time. 
Duwayne Brooks and Neville and Doreen Lawrence were all victims of this doublespeak 
following the murder of Stephen Lawrence, suffering what can certainly be described as 
‘institutional racism’ and perhaps as ‘statutory victimisation’.  
 
Racist violence in England and Wales after the Lawrence Inquiry 
The Inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence brought to light many of the issues 
central to this chapter. It demonstrated that black and Asian people in Britain are 
specifically targeted for ‘everyday’ and politically organised racist violence and that this 
enduring experience of being under attack fundamentally affects how members of ethnic 
minority communities think, feel and act. The inquiry demonstrated that racist violence 
undermines their sense of security as well as their actual safety; it curtails their freedom of 
movement including their ability to visit certain localities; it affects fundamental life 
choices such as where to live and work. Calls for protection by black and Asian 
communities have typically been met with denial either that a problem existed, that it bore 
any connection with racism, or that there were weaknesses in the subsequent police 
response. The Lawrence inquiry brought to light evidence that police are ‘racism-blind’, 
or have a world-view which favours racist offenders over black and Asian communities. 
Ultimately, it demonstrated the failure to meet the requirement to do justice, be fair, and 
ensure community safety (Bowling 1998, 1999). 
The murder of Stephen Lawrence seemed to demonstrate the emptiness of the claim 
that the police and criminal justice system offered equal protection irrespective of race or 
ethnic origin. The main suspects – who had histories of committing extreme violence – 
committed a brutal murder and were then able to get away with it with impunity. Despite 
the exertion of a great amount of effort, police investigators were unable to collect 
sufficient evidence to put a case before the court. The Lawrence Inquiry’s 
acknowledgement that the initial investigation was “marred by a combination of 
professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior 
officers” was symbolically important (Macpherson 1999: 46.1). Even more significant, 
was the empirical and documentary evidence that the Lawrence Inquiry unearthed and 
exposed to public view. As Jack Straw, the Home Secretary commented, in presenting the 
Inquiry report to the House of Commons, it had “opened all our eyes to what it is to be 
black or Asian in Britain today”. A renewed commitment to tackling racist crime, 
ensuring that ethnic minority communities are properly served and protected, in a new era 
of ‘anti-racist policing’ are grounds for optimism about the future. Stephen Lawrence will 
be remembered as one of at least 90 victims of racist murder over the past four decades in 
Britain. But if his death is to mean more than this, police protection and their use of 
coercive powers must now be fair, accountable and respectful of the fundamental human 
rights to life, liberty and security of the person. 
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Conclusion  
 
The explicitly racist murders that have occurred in recent years in Britain, continental 
Europe and north America have extended the spectrum of topics in the ‘race and crime 
debate’ and have focused public attention on ‘white-on-minority’ violence in its most 
extreme form. What seems clear from the research evidence from England and Wales, 
however, is that explicitly racist murder is the most extreme tip of an iceberg comprised of 
less serious instances of violence, and instances where the presence and relevance of 
racism may be less clear-cut. This research evidence suggests a range of future directions 
for scholarship in this area (See also Bowling and Phillips, 2001). 
First, some analytical groundwork is required to establish the boundaries of the 
problem of racist violence. There are some cases in which both extreme levels of violence 
and explicit racism make categorisation unproblematic. However, there are also many 
thousands of instances of intimidation, verbal abuse and vandalism which may terrorise 
individuals and communities, but is not so readily recognised by law enforcement 
agencies or commentators as ‘violence’ (Jacobs and Potter 1998; cf. Bowling 1993a). 
Similarly, there are instances where questions of racist motivation or causation are 
troubled by the existence of other motives or explanations. It is perhaps too much to 
expect these conceptual issues to be resolved with any great finality, but they do require 
continued examination and exploration. 
Secondly, there is a clear need to develop quantitative and qualitative techniques to 
estimate the extent and nature of racist violence at local and regional levels. This paper 
has shown, in common with other work in this sphere, that officially recorded instances of 
racist crime have some limitations, partly the result of the definitional issues mentioned 
above, but compounded by weaknesses in local police and federal recording systems. 
Alternative methods – using survey technology, secondary analysis of police records and 
case-studies – offer opportunities to shed light on this problem at both local and national 
levels. Thirdly, there is a need to develop theories to explain the manifestation of racist 
violence in specific localities, as well as its extent at a national level. Some theories have 
been set out above (most of which have been found wanting), but there are surely further 
lines of inquiry to be developed. 
Finally, there is a need to know more about what works in practice to reduce racist 
violence. Laws enhancing penalties for hate crimes in the USA and for ‘racially 
aggravated offences’ in the UK have been introduced and their use and impact requires 
close monitoring, especially in the light of the sceptical appraisal of their likely 
effectiveness (Jacobs and Potter 1998; Malik 1999). Alternative sentencing approaches – 
including those designed to rehabilitate offenders – require close monitoring and 
evaluation. There are also a range of community-based crime prevention initiatives 
springing up in a variety of different jurisdictions including anti-racist youth work, 
educational programmes and the like. We hope that scholars working within the field of 
‘race’, ethnicity and crime will rise to the challenge of this research agenda. 
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